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In Praise of Peculiar Bliss:
Adherence and Innovation in John Keats’s
Personal Theology
MASON WALKER
The title of John Keats’s 1816 poem “Written in disgust of
vulgar superstition” makes it plain to the reader that the work
embodies a spirited invective against religious faith. The poem
spends most of its fourteen lines bemoaning the incessant sound
of the ever-present bells, which “call… the people to some other
prayers/Some other gloominess, more dreadful cares” (2-3). Keats
hopes that these bells, along with the countless churches of which
they are a part, will soon be “dying like an outburnt lamp” (11).
He also declares that, in their absence, he hopes for “fresh
flowers… and many glories of immortal stamp” (13-14). If the
poem’s preceding lines are a potent mixture of disgusted diatribe
and despairing lament, its final two constitute a wholly surprising
expression of hope.
They also prompt a significant question: Just what are the
“fresh flowers” that Keats seeks? For what new kinds of
transcendence would the destruction of conventional religion
pave the way? An examination of Keats’s body of poetic work and
his letters, along with modern scholarship concerning both, will
help us construct an answer. By utilizing these various sources, I
maintain that John Keats, though not conventionally religious,
had a highly creative and compelling personal theology of his
own. More specifically, it is important to note that while this
theology, like most Christian ones, sees suffering as a possible aid
to redemption and salvation, its conception of what redemption
and salvation entail diverges significantly from traditional
Christian thought. Keats’s personal theology, by contrast, centers
on the ability of human beings to secure their own singular
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redemption and salvation, and on the unique types of figurative
immortality afforded to us by our knowledge of our own
transience. Ultimately, this personal theology is, for all its
rebelliousness, structurally dependent on Christianity; after all, it
was by opposing Christian teaching that Keats slowly but surely
formed spiritual and philosophical opinions of his own. While
establishing and arguing for the existence of Keats’s own personal
theology, I also argue that these “fresh flowers” of religious
thought grew from decidedly Christian soil.
I. The Value of Suffering
“There are no crown-wearers in heaven who were not cross-bearers here
below.”Charles Spurgeon, Baptist minister
When Christianity first emerged, one of its revolutionary
currents of thought was a radically new attitude toward suffering,
one rarely heard prior to the time of Christ. The ingenuity of the
Christian solution resided in the way it saw value in suffering
without dismissing or belittling the agonies that such suffering
caused. With his abiding love of nature and intense interest in
self-transcendence, Keats would be easy to regard as a sort of
proto-Buddhist. However, in his response to human suffering, it is
much easier to claim that he was a pseudo-Christian.
Keats’s response to suffering was formed over the course
of several years of protracted and powerfully engaged thinking.
After all, a man whose family ranks are filled with the diseased
and dying will likely ruminate upon this question. Yet Keats knew
not only of external suffering but also of the internal torments of
the mind; in “Ode to a Nightingale,” he bemoans that “to think is
to be full of sorrow/And leaden-eyed despairs” (27-28). As such,
dealing with the problem of suffering was essential to Keats’s own
emotional and mental well-being. In Keats, Skepticism, and the
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Religion of Beauty, Ronald A. Sharp suggests that Keats was aware
of the need to reckon with this recurring obstacle, and he
concludes that a significant amount of Keats’s work can be read as
an attempt to work out a philosophy that would serve as a
“solution to the traditional religious problems of suffering” (25).
While Sharp correctly identifies the problem of suffering as a
central conceit in Keats’s poetry, he is wrong to call Keats’s
response to the problem of suffering “a solution” to the traditional
Christian approach. In fact, Keats’s response to suffering is highly
Christianized. Like the traditional Christian, Keats sees suffering
as an aspect of existence that is assuredly permanent, always
difficult, and yet often an integral part of that which is good.
This belief is most clearly and overtly outlined in “Ode on
Melancholy,” with its memorable statement that “Ay, in the very
temple of Delight/Veil’d Melancholy has her sovran shrine” (2627). Keats’s diction here is nothing short of brilliant, with a
multiplicity of meanings that relay clearly and powerfully the
interconnectedness of his two subjects. The use of architectural
language implies that Delight and Melancholy are, quite literally,
part of the same structure. In addition to being architectural, the
language is also resonantly religious. It the world of John Keats, it
is as if one enters the temple of Delight to pay tribute to
Melancholy—to give thanks to her for often making Delight and
other positive emotions possible. Here, Keats expresses a notably
Christian outlook on suffering. He does not praise it in and of
itself but instead acknowledges that it is inseparable from much
that is worthy and desirable in this world. While “Ode on
Melancholy” is Keats’s clearest expression of suffering’s potential
value, he does address the subject in several other poems,
including “Ode on Indolence.” In that poem, he begs the winged
spirits of Love, Ambition, and Poesy to leave him alone: “Ye
cannot raise/My head cool-bedded in the flowery grass” (51-52).
The sprits are attempting to stir Keats to energy and productivity,
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but he knows that now is no time for urgency. If the insistent
spirits were to remove his head from the grass and drag him back
to the bustling activity of the world around him, he would have
little to produce. It is this state of slow and lazy sadness,
contemplation, and isolation that will ultimately give him the
ability to create “visions for the night” and “for the day” (Keats
56-57). Only keeping his head in the dark of the grass will
eventually ignite the light of inspiration that he needs in order to
write well. Keats is not praising indolence simply for its own sake;
wallowing in despair with a decided lack of reason is not an
intrinsic good. But once again, Keats acknowledges that such
suffering can be inseparable from some kinds of desired emotions.
In this particular case, the emotion under examination is
inspiration.
In both pieces, Keats adheres in no small part to the
Christian response to suffering, which may be summed up thus:
suffering, while not a good in and of itself, can be necessary to
secure that which is in fact good. Keats’s personal theology, like
that of Christians, holds suffering as a necessary difficulty that
allows access to the ultimate “goods”—redemption and salvation.
That said, his conceptions of redemption and salvation differs
significantly from those of Christianity.
II. Beauty: The Great Redeemer
“The moon is utterly reasonable; and [yet] the moon is the mother of
lunatics and has given to them all her name.” GK Chesterton, AngloCatholic apologist
Like Christian theology, John Keats’s personal theology
includes the idea of redemption. However, in the realm of
Keatsian thought, the word “redemption” denotes something very
different. While Keats’s religious conception is not a Christian
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one, it does have at its heart the same basic concern as the above
statement by a famed Christian apologist—namely, the concern
that reason and logic, when left unchecked, will levy serious
difficulties upon mankind. We need the mysterious, the
numinous, the wondrous.We need the beautiful. Indeed, Keats’s
sonnet “To Byron” contains a line uncannily similar to the
Chesterton quote. Praising his fellow poet, Keats states that
Byron’s beautiful words make him feel “as when a cloud a golden
moon doth veil/Its sides are tinged with a resplendent glow” (910). This is an excellent symbol for Keats’s overall idea of beauty:
Beauty is that which veils the frigid rationality of Chesterton’s
moon and thus introduces strangeness, variety, and wonder into a
world filled with cold, uncaring reason. Beauty temporarily
enriches a relentless reality. Temporarily is the operative word, for
Keats reminds us time and again in his work that this redemption
of the world is only momentary. In “Ode to a Nightingale,” Keats
bemoans the pain brought on by this transience: “Forlorn! the
very word is like a bell/To toll me back from thee to my sole self”
(71-72). The almost funereal tone of the passage conveys the
powerful feeling that the author’s transcendent experience is
dying away and that he is returning to the sobering confines of the
rational world. In negative terms, the suggestion remains that we
cannot live in these moments of beautiful transcendence forever,
but much of Keats’s work also restates this conclusion in positive
terms. We can, after all, live in such moments every now and then.
Describing Keats’s overall idea of beauty, Sharp states, “Beauty...
is life affirming... and it is consoling. Beauty exercises an
ameliorating effect on human suffering—not a permanent
eradication of it but a soothing of the distressed spirit” (29). The
critic is right to proclaim that, for Keats, beauty’s temporary
ability to soothe and console is exactly what makes it useful. It is
not a permanent condition one may live in but a temporary balm
to be savored. Sharp is also correct to note that Keats’s idea of
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beauty does not include the eradication of that which is ugly or
undesirable about the world; as previously noted, Keats believes
that only temporary redemption of this strange and damaged
place is possible. The critic’s claim that Keastian beauty
“ameliorates suffering,” however, does not pay sufficient
attention to a provocative paradox in Keats’s personal theology.
Yes, for Keats, beauty does “ameliorate suffering,” but it also often
emerges from suffering. After all, the beautiful temple of Delight
has Melancholy at its center, and the poet’s “beautiful visions” are
a product of the quiet despair felt in the darkness of the grass.
Having concluded the discussion of Keats’s personal
theory of beauty, we may now provide a general summary of his
theology. Like Christian theology, Keats’s theology has a Great
Redeemer. Yet unlike Christianity, with its promise of permanent
redemption through Jesus Christ, Keats’s redemption is only
temporary; beauty comes and goes. What is more, Keatsian
redemption is not won through any intermediary but rather by
each individual who perceives unique patterns of beauty in the
world. The idea of securing a subjective road to temporary
redemption is a thoroughly un-Christian one, and yet, in order for
Keats to be un-Christian, Christianity had to be there first, ready to
be rebelled against, a structure to be dismantled. We see once
again that Keats’s “fresh flowers” came, in some ways, from old
soil.
III. Salvation and the “Vale of Soul-Making”
“I am intent upon this one purpose… and with this goal in view I press
on, eager for the prize, God's heavenly summons.” St. Augustine of
Hippo, Catholic theologian
We come at last to the ultimate end, or telos, of John Keats’s
personal theology: the possibility of salvation. It is here that Keats
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most definitively diverges from the Christian blueprint, emerging
with a conception of salvific potential compatible with the
rationalism of his century and the mystic leanings of his mind.
This aspect of Keats’s theology needs examination, for it is here
that his insights are the most creative and expansive. Sharp argues
that Keats, while far from a flat-out rationalist, did build his idea
of salvation upon a foundation of skeptic humanism; for Keats,
“rewards, if any, must be experienced in this life” because Keats’s
theology functions “only in this kind of fully human framework”
(51). Indeed, perhaps the phrase which best describes Keats’s
radically un-Christian sort of salvation is “fully human.” Crafting
any sort of salvation was, as Keats knew, a fundamentally
unscientific, empirically unverifiable quest. Yet he still wished for
his idea of salvation to reflect his so-called rational rejections of
the Christian system of thought and the humanist conclusions to
which those rejections had carried him.
While Keats’s ideas regarding salvation may be seen in
some of his poems, most especially his two Hyperion fragments, it
is in his 1819 letter to George and Georgiana Keats, that he most
clearly outlines his vision of a “vale of Soul-making.” Keats
introduces it as follows: “The common cognomen of this world
among the misguided and superstitious is a ‘vale of tears’ from
which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary imposition of
God and taken to Heaven—what a circumscribe[d] straightened
notion! Call the world if you Please ‘The vale of Soul-making’’’
(505). First, it is worth discussing precisely why, within Keats’s
theology, the “common cognomen” is ultimately wrong. The
Christian system of salvation may be otherworldly, but it does
feature a strange lack of mysticism that is actually anti-Keatsian.
For when the “vale of tears” is wiped away, all is revealed—every
facet of a Higher Kingdom, every great truth about the world,
every conceivable question regarding our ways of being and
thinking and believing. For Keats, who in “To Homer” praised the
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strange perceptivity of those with “triple sight in blindness keen”
(12), there is something seriously important about mystery, about
the strange way humans are situated between the un-seeing of
animals and the all-seeing of a Higher Power. This is a uniquely
human position, and, as Sharp reminds us, Keats aimed for his
personal theology to be a uniquely human creation.
Keats also took offense at the idea of God’s “arbitrary
imposition” of redemption. As critic Robert Ryan notes, Keats’s
attempt to make a blanket criticism of Christianity based upon
this issue is flawed: “What Keats is rejecting is, apparently, a
Calvinist understanding… he does not seem to be aware that
there are other authentic theological traditions—the Catholic and
the Arminian Protestant, for example—that place a higher value
on personal spiritual development” (199).Keats does seem
wrongly to ascribe some aspects of pre-destination to all of the
Christian faith, not just certain denominations. But it is not clear
that a denomination which places “a higher value on personal
spiritual development” would have ultimately won Keats over. In
his writing, he places the ultimate value on personal spiritual
development. As he attempts to craft a “fully human” personal
theology, there is no room for the idea that those humans need
some sort of all-powerful intermediary to save them. Indeed,
when Keats does discuss the idea of God, he integrates it into this
most human of salvation theologies by locating the deity within
the human mind. “Intelligences,” he states, “are atoms of
perception… in short they are God” (505). This is not to say that
man is akin to the all-powerful Christian God—to say so would
negate Keats’s emphasis on half-seeing. But man’s intelligence,
like God, helps to provide him with the wisdom needed to secure
salvation. There is no “summons,” to use a phrase from the above
Augustine passage. We are, ultimately, saved by our own singular
human traits.
Equally offensive to Keats’s idea of salvation is the sort of
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“Heaven” that God would summon us to. In addition to being a
place of everlasting clarity, this Heaven would also be a place of
everlasting joy, of eternal sharing in God, who is objectively the
greatest good. But rather than this everlasting bliss and
understanding, Keats suggests that a salvation theology should
concern itself with the following question: “How then are these
sparks… ever to possess a bliss peculiar to each one’s individual
existence?” (505). This understanding of salvation centers around
one of our most singular traits as a species. Part of what makes
humans unique is the fact that, unlike, say, nightingales, our songs
are not the same. We are capable of producing different
perspectives on the world and, as such, are capable of unearthing
wildly differing ways to find beautiful redemption and meaning
in it, thus saving ourselves from a dull and despairing life. We see
now that, for Keats, a fully human salvation is fully individual and
therefore rests in finding “a bliss peculiar to each one’s individual
existence.”
Ultimately, the salvation aspect of Keats’s theology is built
upon our unique human qualities: our singular faculties of
perception, our chronic lack of surety, and our certain
appointment with death. For Keats, salvation is won via an
individual’s own ability to find “bliss peculiar” and to redeem the
world in his own way. Of course, like all other aspects of Keats’s
theology, it cannot be entirely new; it relies on the Christian
beliefs it resists. But Keats’s theory of salvation, his establishment
of a telos that celebrates “the pain alone, the joy alone, distinct” to
being a human being (174) is perhaps the most richly unique—the
most exhilaratingly and most exclusively Keatsian—of all the
man’s theological conceits.
Conclusion
In today’s age, many object to Christian theology on the
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grounds that it is insufficiently rational. So did Keats. Yet he also
objected, in a way, to its excessive rationality. To Keats,
Christianity promoted superstitions that insulted the intelligence,
but by attempting to erect a thought system that would categorize
and explain all of life, it also possessed an inherent lack of
mystery, along with a serious dearth of possibilities for individual
discovery. Ultimately, Keats held on to the greatest piece of
wisdom he could locate within the system of Christianity: the
value of suffering. Then, by rejecting the rest, he began to form a
system of his own, one that insists that we redeem and save
ourselves by making our own unique and beautiful responses to a
world that is uniquely and beautifully mysterious to us. In
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, a work also replete with
discussions of seeing, a character realizes that “[t]he great
revelation perhaps never did come. Instead, there were little daily
miracles, illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark”
(Woolf 161). According to John Keats, these “matches struck in the
dark” are the stuff of our hard-earned salvation.
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